America’s National Security Vulnerability: Generic Drug Manufacturing and Biotechnology Innovation | Business Executives for National Security

Report at a Glance

In Generic Drug Manufacturing and Biotechnology Innovation, BENS provides a comprehensive assessment that:

Examines

the critical role pharmaceutical supply chains play in U.S. national security

Identifies

major chokepoints that threaten supply chain resilience

Assesses

current and emerging vulnerabilities

Outlines

policy recommendations to strengthen U.S. pharmaceutical infrastructure and mitigate strategic risks

Executive Summary

While defense equipment and semiconductor manufacturing have long been recognized as vital sectors for U.S. commerce and national security, the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain - more specifically, the production of generic drugs and their underlying chemical components - has atrophied domestically while flourishing in adversarial states.

As the United States has grown increasingly reliant on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for a significant amount of its pharmaceutical imports and other raw materials vital to U.S. economic competitiveness, the PRC has emerged as a top geopolitical competitor. A 2019 report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission sounded the alarm that “should Beijing opt to use U.S. dependence on China as an economic weapon... it would have a serious effect on the health of U.S. consumers”.¹ This divergence - growing economic dependence amid intensifying strategic competition - creates a profound, existential threat that transcends public health.

China, which began heavily investing in the biotechnology sector in the 1980s, is now a biopharmaceutical powerhouse and has strategically positioned itself throughout the global supply chain. Today, the United States is heavily dependent on PRC-made active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and key starting materials (KSMs), the critical components and raw materials in pharmaceutical products. One of the most significant vulnerabilities for the U.S. biotechnology sector stems from the extensive offshoring of APIs and KSMs, which are the backbone of the generic drug supply chain. Although the United States manufactures a portion of its finished-dose generic drugs domestically, this capacity is often illusory in terms of security, as it relies heavily on overseas suppliers for the APIs and KSMs needed to produce them.

The following statistics highlight this vulnerability:

In 2023 approximately 91 percent of drugs prescribed by physicians in the United States were generic drugs.²
In 2021, an estimated 87 percent of U.S. generic drug manufacturing facilities were located abroad.³
In 2019, the FDA estimated that nearly 40 percent of finished drugs and approximately 80 percent of APIs were manufactured overseas.⁴
The United States imports many of its APIs from China, with estimates varying from 8 percent to as high as 47 percent.⁵
The United States is heavily reliant on India for APIs, KSMs, and finished drug products, while India imports 80 percent of its APIs from China.⁶

This web of foreign dependencies centered around China has contributed to frequent drug shortages in the United States. In 2024, the United States recorded its highest number of drug shortages to date, affecting 323 medications.⁷ Many of these shortages were linked to delays or interruptions in obtaining APIs and KSMs essential for generic drug manufacturing. Antibiotics have proven especially vulnerable, experiencing shortages at a rate 42 percent higher than other generics.⁸

Persistent shortages not only limit access to essential medicines but also place national stockpiles at risk. Strengthening U.S. generic pharmaceutical supply chains is crucial to ensure national security, economic competitiveness, and the health of the American people. The findings and recommendations of this report highlight the urgency to address these vulnerabilities through coordinated policy action, targeted investments, and enhanced transparency across these supply chains.

01 Introduction

Global Biotechnology Competition and Implications for U.S. National Security

Biotechnology and pharmaceuticals have emerged as strategic frontiers in the global competition between the United States and China. Biotechnology is the design and engineering of biological systems that enables humans to create products from medicines to crops to materials, across many sectors. These industries are not only vital to the health and prosperity of all Americans, but also to U.S. national security, economic resilience, and technological leadership. Over the last four decades, the United States and China have invested heavily in advancing their own biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, but the balance of power is shifting towards Beijing. ⁹

The shift in global pharmaceutical power is not the result of the "invisible hand" of the market alone - it is the product of deliberate, long-term industrial policy. The PRC’s biotechnological rise began around the 1980s and quickly gained steam. By 1987, PRC scientists had developed recombinant human interferon α1b, the first domestic biopharmaceutical produced through genetic engineering.¹⁰

This and other milestones catalyzed China’s national effort to accelerate its domestic biotech innovation, including policy initiatives such as “Made in China 2025,” which sought to position Beijing as a global leader in strategic sectors within ten years.

The PRC has identified biotechnology as a strategic industry and provides extensive state subsidies and infrastructure support to the sector. The results of this state-directed capitalism are stark.

Between 2016 and 2021, PRC biotech firms reached an estimated market value of $300 billion.¹¹China is positioning itself to capture the majority of future value growth by dominating the upstream supply of materials. This gives it the opportunity to capture the growing global API market, which was valued at $226 billion in 2024 and forecast to increase to nearly $240 billion by the end of 2025 and $405 billion by 2034.¹²

America’s reliance on foreign sources for APIs, KSMs, and generic drugs has grown over several decades. The elimination of tariffs on formulated dosage form pharmaceuticals in 2000, following the 1995 World Trade Organization Pharmaceutical Tariff Elimination Agreement, was a key accelerator of this trend.

This move incentivized the importing of finished drug products to the United States, which led to a collapse of domestic manufacturing.¹³ The COVID-19 pandemic also exposed severe weaknesses in U.S. supply chain resilience, illustrating how disruptions in foreign manufacturing can endanger the lives of millions of Americans.

Today, India and China supply 90 percent of all generic prescriptions used by Americans.

While the United States imports 52 percent of innovative and novel drugs from countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, and Israel.¹⁴

Currently, only 20 percent of U.S. generic drugs are manufactured domestically, a consequence of cost-driven offshoring. Although low-cost imports benefit consumers through cheaper generic drug prices, this dependency poses long-term risks to both U.S. economic and national security.¹⁵

U.S. Health Security & Pharmaceutical Vulnerabilities

APIs are crucial for modern healthcare; their active components either suppress or enhance functions within the human body.

KSMs are the precursor reagents produced through chemical or natural synthesis that are used to make APIs. APIs are critical for medications that manage chronic diseases such as cancer, hypertension, diabetes, cardiovascular conditions, and other chronic conditions.

For these medications, high purity, consistent quality, and the ability to be produced at large-scale is essential. Increased demand for medications to treat chronic disease is driving significant demand for advanced therapies, including those that rely on both small-molecule and biologic APIs.

State of U.S. Generic Drug Manufacturing

Over the past several decades, U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturing has undergone a sustained exodus, particularly in the generic drug sector, where profit margins are extremely low. This makes it financially unsustainable for companies to maintain U.S.-based production facilities that must meet stringent regulatory standards and bear higher labor costs. While American consumers have benefited from nearly tariff-free generic drug imports and the lowest drug prices among peer nations, overreliance on foreign production of essential pharmaceutical ingredients represents a significant national security risk.

The pharmaceutical supply chain has evolved into a complex matrix of interdependencies with multiple chokepoints including China's near-monopolistic control of KSMs, the reliance on Indian manufacturing for finished doses, and the extreme geographic concentration of production in regions increasingly vulnerable to water scarcity, natural disasters, and geopolitical weaponization.²⁰ As stated above, only 20 percent of generic drugs are manufactured in the United States as a result of accelerated offshoring of production. This has been driven by lower production costs, in particular. By some estimates, it costs 50 percent less to produce APIs in India versus in the United States or Europe, with labor costs in India and China estimated to be one-tenth of the cost for a Western company.

The United States directly imports 16 percent of its APIs from China. However, it also imports 40 percent of finished drug dosages from India, while India imports 80 percent of its APIs from China. This creates a cascading dependency: a disruption in China’s pharmaceutical sector immediately ripples through India’s pharmaceutical industry, effectively halting the flow of finished drugs and APIs to the United States.

Foreign sites accounted for approximately 87 percent of U.S. generic drug manufacturing facilities in 2021.²²

One such generic drug manufacturing facility was Viatris (formerly known as Mylan), located in West Virginia, which once employed 1,400 workers and produced critical generic medications across many therapeutic areas including antibiotics, cardiovascular, and autoimmune diseases. One of the many generic drug companies to move India and benefit from lower production costs. America’s last factory producing penicillin, one of the most basic generic therapeutics, closed in 2004, leaving the nation completely reliant on foreign sources for this essential drug.²³ These closures illustrate how economic pressures have systematically dismantled America's pharmaceutical manufacturing infrastructure, shifting production to lower-cost countries like China and India while eliminating thousands of domestic jobs.²⁴

Current Vulnerabilities in the U.S.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reported that approximately 323 drugs were in shortage as of 2024. These shortages disproportionately affect critical medications such as sterile injectables, antibiotics, hormone therapies, chemotherapies, and intravenous fluids.²⁵
The API Innovation Center (APIIC), a non-profit research organization, examined a subset of 40 essential drug molecules, the "Vital 40," selected through a prioritization framework based on trade data, supplier maps, regulatory findings, and proprietary commercial sourcing data. The Vital 40 list includes life-saving cancer therapies such as Capecitabine and Oxaliplatin, pain medications like Propofol, cardiovascular drugs such as Dabigatran, as well as commonly prescribed therapeutics for asthma and anxiety.

The findings showed that India supplies about 63 percent of these APIs, followed by Europe at 22 percent, China at 8 percent, and the United States at just 5 percent.

An analysis of KSMs reveals that China is the only supplier for the KSMs of 679 different APIs, whereas the United States and European Union are the sole suppliers for only 44.

These figures underscore the near-complete offshoring of essential drug manufacturing in the United States and the significant lag behind China in domestic production capacity.

While trade data shows China supplies only 8 percent of the “Vital 40” APIs directly, this masks the deeper dependency. An analysis of KSMs reveals that China is the only supplier for the KSMs of 679 different APIs, whereas the United States and European Union are the sole suppliers for only 44.²⁶ The 5 percent U.S. domestic API production figure indicates that, for the vast majority of these life-saving drugs, the United States has virtually no surge capacity or fallback option if global trade is disrupted.

Stockpiling: Addressing Potential Shortages and Strategic Gaps

The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a federal repository of medical countermeasures such vaccines, antimicrobials, personal protective equipment, antidotes, and medical supplies managed by the Administration for Strategic Response (ASPR) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This stockpile acts as a short-term buffer for deployment in public health emergencies when critical materials are scarce or unavailable in the case of a pandemic or large-scale chemical, biological, or nuclear event.²⁷

In August 2025, the Trump administration’s Executive Order (EO), Ensuring American Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Resilience by Filling the Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Reserve, directed ASPR to identify and stockpile APIs for approximately 26 essential medicines. The Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Reserve (SAPIR), first created in 2020, is now being refilled and expanded. This EO represents a step in the right direction: stockpiling APIs which have longer shelf lives than finished drug products and could reduce risk at multiple stress points in the supply chain. However, stockpiling alone is insufficient.²⁸It is a passive defense mechanism that buys time but does not solve the underlying structural deficit. Without a functioning industrial base to replenish the stockpile, the reserve is merely a finite resource that will eventually run dry in a prolonged crisis. Government purchases of APIs to fill SAPIR could help stimulate domestic production, but only if supported by sustained policy and investment.²⁹

Situation Analysis

The PRC's Innovation Strategy

The PRC has prioritized domestic biotechnology and pharmaceutical development for decades, placing increasing emphasis on supporting the industry in recent years. This was particularly evident in the PRC’s “Made in China 2025” mentioned above, its 14th Five-Year Plan announced in 2021, and its 15th Five-Year Plan finalized in late 2025 and expected to be published in early 2026. These efforts sought to transform China into a global leader in high-tech manufacturing, with biotechnology identified as one of ten key strategic sectors.³⁰

An additional factor that contributed to the PRC’s rapid growth in biotechnology is its human capital strategy. The Thousand Talents Program, for example, sought to recruit Chinese nationals and foreign experts in science and technology to advance its expertise across strategic sectors, including biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Returning scientists brought advanced process chemistry knowledge from Western institutions. One Stanford University analysis indicated that the Thousand Talents Program scientists produced 27 percent more publications than their international peers after returning from faculty appointments obtained abroad.³¹ By effectively re-importing the knowledge generated in Western universities and corporate labs, China accelerated its own development curve by decades.

This technical knowhow has immense economic benefits as well. China’s pharmaceutical industry has propelled the country to become one of the world's fastest-growing pharmaceutical markets. According to market research forecasts, the value of China’s pharmaceutical market is expected to exceed $270 billion in 2025, with an annual growth rate of more than 10 percent over the next seven years and an estimated value of $540 billion by 2032.³²

The value of the U.S. market still exceeds that of China’s, with a value of $680 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $1.2 trillion by 2034.³³ China's population of 1.4 billion people enables its API and KSM producers to achieve profitable, high-volume production by serving domestic demand alone. Manufacturers in the PRC can reduce these investments over time across domestic production volumes that competitors in smaller markets cannot match without exporting, thereby avoiding the regulatory hurdles and logistics costs faced by foreign manufacturers. This "home court advantage" allows PRC firms to achieve economies of scale that make them price-competitive globally, even before they export anything. The result is a subsidy engine that crushes foreign competition.³⁴

China's national volume-based drug procurement (NVBP) policy has significantly transformed the country's pharmaceutical distribution system among companies. Enacted in 2025, the main purpose is to reduce drug costs by consolidating demand from various medical institutions across the country, where manufacturers cut prices by 60 to 80 percent to win procurement contracts. This policy creates a "volume-for-price" exchange mechanism through centralized obligations, resulting in increased price competition in the generic drug market. With lower prices incentivizing research and development, more innovative drugs reach the market. This development could potentially benefit China's consumers by investing these cost savings into later-generation pharmaceutical products.³⁵

The PRC's Integrated Supply Chain Infrastructure

China’s API manufacturers benefit heavily from the country’s large, integrated chemical industry. China has more than 20,000 chemical companies and accounts for 40 percent of the global output of chemical industrial activities.³⁶This proximity to raw material suppliers reduces logistics costs, mitigates supply disruptions, and creates a more resilient and efficient supply chain network.³⁷ The disparity in KSM supply capability is stark.

An Analysis Summarized the Supplier Landscape for KSMs ³⁸

China: The only supplier for one KSM for 679 APIs (37 percent of all APIs in the analysis)
India: The only supplier for one KSM for 402 APIs (22 percent of all APIs in the analysis)
U.S. & EU: The only suppliers for one KSM for just 44 APIs (2 percent of all APIs in the analysis)

Risks to U.S. National Security

China's growing dominance in the global pharmaceutical market presents serious risks to U.S. national, economic, and health security. If China overtakes the United States as the leading force in global pharmaceutical manufacturing and innovation, the United States will face significant threats to research security, as PRC state-sponsored entities could gain access to sensitive biomedical research data, clinical trial information, and ownership of drug development methodologies.

The risk of intellectual property (IP) and technological theft is particularly high in the pharmaceutical sector, where billions of dollars and years of research investment can be undermined by the unauthorized acquisition of trade secrets, patent information, and manufacturing processes. PRC companies and research institutions have been implicated in numerous cases of IP theft targeting U.S. pharmaceutical innovations, from small molecule drugs to advanced biologics and gene therapies.³⁹

Beyond threats to research security, IP theft, and technological leadership, the PRC could also leverage supply chain chokepoints against the United States in the event of a conflict.

Risk Assessment

To evaluate the threats posed by overseas API and KSM dependence, this assessment employs a structured risk framework that examines three critical risk categories: foreign dependence, geopolitical escalation, and climate and disaster risks.

Foreign Dependence Risks

The concentration of API and KSM manufacturing in a limited number of foreign countries, primarily China and India, creates supply chain vulnerabilities where export bans, policy shifts, shipping disruptions, or global health crises could cripple the U.S. generic drug supply chain.

India, often called the "pharmacy of the world," manufactures approximately 20 percent of global generic drugs.⁴⁰

According to a 2020 Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) report, India's pharmaceutical supply chain exhibits a cascading dependency on China that ultimately affects U.S. drug availability.

The report found that from 2019 to 2020, India imported 70 to 79 percent of its supply for 41 drug products (including finished dosages and APIs) from China, totaling $1.98 billion, or 25 percent of India's total pharmaceutical imports.

Additionally, 70 drug products from India showed 100 percent import dependency on China, though these represented only $239 million (3 percent of import value).⁴¹

U.S. dependence on India for key pharmaceutical products means that disruptions in PRC manufacturing can ripple through India's production capacity and subsequently impact drug availability in the United States.

In response to PRC supply chain vulnerabilities, Bangladesh, for example, has implemented tax and cash incentives for domestic firms to reduce reliance on imported APIs. The government offers tax incentives to pharmaceutical manufacturers while providing a 20 percent cash incentive to API producers who incorporate at least 20 percent locally sourced materials. The need to mitigate such vulnerabilities was underscored when China's export restrictions on APIs during the early months of the pandemic led to severe shortages of APIs in Bangladesh, revealing how dependent the country had become on external suppliers for essential pharmaceutical ingredients.⁴²

Example:

COVID-19 Supply Chain Disruption

The COVID-19 pandemic further exemplified this vulnerability and the devastation it can cause if not taken seriously. In March 2020, India temporarily banned or restricted exports of 26 APIs and pharmaceutical formulations, causing immediate concerns about U.S. drug supplies.⁴³These restrictions accounted for approximately 10 percent of India's pharmaceutical exports and included critical medications such as paracetamol (acetaminophen), antibiotics, and hydroxychloroquine.

China's COVID-19 lockdowns in early 2020 further disrupted API production and shipments globally, with approximately 37 pharmaceutical factories in China manufacturing active ingredients for U.S. drug products shutting down, contributing to shortages of critical medications including antibiotics and pain management drugs.⁴⁴

Geopolitical Escalation Risks

The risk of supply chain weaponization is not theoretical. China has demonstrated its willingness to use its raw materials dominance as strategic leverage, most notably by restricting rare earth exports in 2010 during a territorial dispute with Japan. This precedent was reinforced on October 9, 2025, when Beijing announced new export controls on rare earths and magnets crucial to global supply chains for electric vehicles, drones, missile guidance systems, and semiconductors. If Beijing chooses to extend this strategy to the biotechnology sector, the "bullwhip effect" of a pharmaceutical export ban would cause immediate, asymmetric damage to the U.S. healthcare system and an existential national security crisis.

China's 2020 Export Control Law and 2021 Biosecurity Law provide extensive powers to use pharmaceutical exports as a strategic tool.⁴⁵ A 2023 U.S. Department of Defense study revealed that 27 percent of U.S. military drug purchases depend on PRC suppliers, highlighting a significant vulnerability in U.S. national security infrastructure. U.S. reliance on pharmaceutical supply chains in China creates potential risks not only for the armed forces but also for the broader U.S. healthcare system, highlighting the need for domestic manufacturing capacity and supply chain diversification.⁴⁶

Climate & Disaster Risks

Single-site production of APIs leaves the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain vulnerable to localized natural disasters, as climate change increases the frequency and severity of disruptive weather events. Geographic concentration of global pharmaceutical manufacturing sites also creates disaster vulnerabilities. For example, Puerto Rico produces 44 percent of intravenous fluid (IV) bags used in U.S. hospitals. However, Hurricane Maria's devastation of Puerto Rico in 2017 disrupted the production of small-volume IV solutions used to dilute potent medications, causing prolonged U.S. shortages. This incident clearly portrays how single-site dependencies, even domestic ones, create fragile supply chains.

Climate change projections indicate an increasing frequency of extreme weather events in regions where major API manufacturing hubs are concentrated, particularly China and India. This creates a critical vulnerability: API manufacturing is highly water-intensive, given that it is a key input for every stage of the chemical synthesis and purification process, and these key production regions face intensifying water stress.⁴⁷ The industry recognizes this risk, with a large majority of top global pharmaceutical companies listing water security as a top sustainability priority. Consequently, future droughts or restrictive water allocation policies in these nations could force production cutbacks, directly reducing the global availability of APIs and finished medicines.

Recommendations to Mitigate Risks and Strengthen U.S. Pharmaceutical Leadership

The geographic concentration of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturing in Western countries and generic pharmaceutical production in India and China further entrenches a system where companies prioritize security and quality for specialty drugs in high-cost regions, while others chase efficiency for low-cost drugs in developing markets. The United States must balance its competitive advantages in innovation and advanced infrastructure with renewed investments in domestic production.

To address the strategic vulnerabilities in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain, this report recommends a coordinated approach that combines:

Targeted investments in domestic manufacturing
Enhanced transparency across supply chains
Robust stockpiling of critical ingredients
Strengthened public-private partnerships

The recommendations below are designed to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign sources, ensure reliable access to essential medicines, and reinforce national and economic security against future disruptions.

Invest in Domestic Manufacturing Capacity

This addresses the economic fundamentals needed to reverse offshoring trends by gradually making domestic production financially competitive through direct fiscal incentives, while also reducing regulatory hurdles. This will allow for collaborative innovation ecosystems that can accelerate domestically manufactured products.

● Incentivize Onshoring

Provide targeted tax credits, grants, and low interest loans to companies that build or modernize API and KSM manufacturing facilities in the United States. Additionally, simplify and expedite FDA approval processes for domestic facilities.⁴⁸

● Public Private Partnerships

Build collaborations between government agencies, industry, and academic institutions to accelerate technology transfer and workforce development.

● Implement “Buy American” Mandates for Sensitive Sectors

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has recommended the Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs source essential medicines exclusively from domestic or trusted-ally facilities.

Enhance Supply Chain Transparency and Resilience

This establishes an information infrastructure that would transform supply chain vulnerabilities from unknown risks to managed variables. Both government agencies and private companies must identify concentration risks, anticipate potential disruptions, and develop targeted mitigation strategies before crises emerge.

● Reporting Requirements

Require manufacturers to disclose the geographic origins of APIs, KSMs, and finished drug products to federal agencies.

● Supply Chain Mapping

Develop a national database to track critical supply chain nodes, chokepoints, and dependencies, enabling rapid response to disruptions.

Advance Manufacturing Innovation and Technology Adoption

This focuses on a forward-looking approach as a competitive strategy. Next-generation manufacturing processes can offset labor cost disadvantages, improve quality, and fortify infrastructure against threats that could compromise supply security.

● Continuous Manufacturing

Support the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies such as continuous flow and modular production to increase efficiency.

● Research and Development Funding

Invest in R&D for novel synthesis methods, alternative raw materials, and digital supply chain management.

Prioritize International Sourcing and Strengthened Allied Partnerships

This targets diversification that reduces geopolitical risk without relying on onshoring alone. This builds redundancy into the generic drug supply chains through allies who share democratic values and regulatory standards.

● Nearshoring Initiatives

Promote sourcing from allies and partner nations with robust regulatory standards, such as Canada, EU, and Japan, to reduce reliance on high-risk nations.

● Global Collaboration

Participate in international forums to share best practices and coordinate responses to global shortages. This should also include negotiating trade deals with allies and partners to ensure pharmaceutical supply chain security.

Develop Workforce and Educational Opportunities

This addresses the requirement of a skilled workforce for long-term competitiveness. By investing in both immediate workforce training and long-term educational pipeline development, this approach ensures that domestic manufacturing capacity expansion is sustainable.

● Training Programs

Fund training programs for pharmaceutical engineers, chemists, and supply chain professionals.

● STEM Education

Diversify programs in STEM to include biomanufacturing and pharmaceutical sciences to build a robust talent pipeline.

Increase Strategic Stockpiling, Reserves, and Scenario Planning

This creates buffers and contingency frameworks to ensure continuity of pharmaceutical supply during any kind of disruptions. Even with diversified and transparent supply chains, crises will occur, therefore well-stocked reserves and rehearsed response protocols are needed to prevent shortages.

● Expand SAPIR

Increase scope and funding of the Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Reserve to cover a broad range of essential APIs and KSMs.

●Inventory Management

Implement real time monitoring and optimize stockpile levels to anticipate shortages. Establish mechanisms to rotate stockpiled APIs to prevent expiration and ensure readiness.

● Contingency Planning

Continually updating contingency plans for supply chain disruptions caused by geopolitical events, pandemics, or natural disasters.

The Path Forward

Implementing these recommendations will require coordinated action across government, industry, and academia. By investing in domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, enhancing supply chain transparency, diversifying API and KSM sources, and fostering biotechnological innovation, the United States can build a more resilient pharmaceutical supply chain that will protect public health as well as national and economic security.

A coordinated national effort that combines policy reform, strategic investments, and cross sector collaborations can achieve a secure, sustainable, and competitive supply chain for the future while ensuring the United States remains the global leader in secure, domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing.

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Report at a Glance

Examines

Identifies

Assesses

Outlines

Global Biotechnology Competition and Implications for U.S. National Security

U.S. Health Security & Pharmaceutical Vulnerabilities

Situation Analysis

An Analysis Summarized the Supplier Landscape for KSMs ³⁸

Risk Assessment

COVID-19 Supply Chain Disruption

Recommendations to Mitigate Risks and Strengthen U.S. Pharmaceutical Leadership

Invest in Domestic Manufacturing Capacity

Enhance Supply Chain Transparency and Resilience

Advance Manufacturing Innovation and Technology Adoption

Prioritize International Sourcing and Strengthened Allied Partnerships

Develop Workforce and Educational Opportunities

Increase Strategic Stockpiling, Reserves, and Scenario Planning

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About Us

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Report at a Glance

Examines

Identifies

Assesses

Outlines

Global Biotechnology Competition and Implications for U.S. National Security

U.S. Health Security & Pharmaceutical Vulnerabilities

Situation Analysis

An Analysis Summarized the Supplier Landscape for KSMs 38

Risk Assessment

COVID-19 Supply Chain Disruption

Recommendations to Mitigate Risks and Strengthen U.S. Pharmaceutical Leadership

Invest in Domestic Manufacturing Capacity

Enhance Supply Chain Transparency and Resilience

Advance Manufacturing Innovation and Technology Adoption

Prioritize International Sourcing and Strengthened Allied Partnerships

Develop Workforce and Educational Opportunities

Increase Strategic Stockpiling, Reserves, and Scenario Planning

An Analysis Summarized the Supplier Landscape for KSMs ³⁸