Vietnam Will Expand US Security Ties Incrementally

This article was written by Dr. Joydeep Sen for Oxford Analytica. BENS has been generously granted permission to share with our members. All rights reserved.

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Hanoi increasingly sees Washington as a key security partner

Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary and state President To Lam is scheduled to meet US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York tomorrow. Earlier this month, Defence Minister Phan Van Giang met US counterpart Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon. In September 2023, during a visit by Biden to Vietnam, Hanoi and Washington elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

What’s Next

Vietnam and the United States, which both seek to counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, will expand their security ties, focusing mainly on Vietnam War legacy issues and defence engagements. However, Hanoi will try to ensure that this happens only gradually, wary of antagonising Beijing. US military sales to Vietnam will increase but are unlikely to include major items due to budgetary, interoperability and trust issues.

Subsidiary Impacts

• Vietnam will increase purchases of non-lethal military equipment from the United States.
• Bilateral security cooperation will remain focused on low-sensitivity areas.
• The outcome of November’s US presidential election is unlikely to have a major bearing on the trajectory of Vietnamese-US defence relations.

Analysis

Giang and Austin met on September 9. They signed an Updated Joint Vision Statement on bilateral defence relations that provides a roadmap for enhanced security cooperation.

Vietnam also has comprehensive strategic partnerships with a handful of other countries, including:

• Russia, its traditional security partner; and
• China, with which it has a complex relationship based on ‘cooperation and struggle’.

Vietnamese and US threat perceptions converge on China. Hanoi and Beijing have competing claims in the South China Sea that occasionally lead to tensions between the Vietnamese and Chinese coast guards. Washington sees Beijing as its principal rival in the Indo-Pacific region and a challenge to the US-led international order.

Vietnam and the United States both aim to preserve freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Washington opposes Beijing’s expansive claims in those waters — deemed invalid by an international tribunal in 2016 — and champions the maritime rights of all the South-east Asian claimant.

To enhance Vietnam’s ability to defend its maritime rights, the United States transferred two refurbished Hamilton-class cutters to the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG). The handover of a third such vessel is expected soon.

Senior Vietnamese officials try to reassure their Chinese counterparts that Hanoi’s defence ties with Washington are not aimed at Beijing.

Vietnam’s incremental approach to advancing security ties with the United States will not change unless China adopts a much more aggressive posture in the South China Sea.

Vietnam War legacy issues

Hanoi and Washington will keep working together to address the legacy of the Vietnam War.

Key problems include unexploded ordinance (UXO), which maims hundreds of people every year, and the Agent Orange defoliant, linked to birth defects.

The White House announced during Biden’s visit to Vietnam that the United States would give the Vietnam National Mine Action Centre an additional USD25mn for locating and destroying UXO. It said Washington’s contribution to UXO activities since 1993 stood at USD230mn.

When Austin met Giang, he committed a further USD65mn over the next five years towards dioxin remediation efforts at the Bien Hoa Air Base, the main storage and handling site for Agent Orange during the conflict. This would bring the Pentagon’s total contribution in this regard to USD215mn.

Over 1,200 US service personnel are still listed as missing in action (MIA) in Vietnam while Vietnamese soldiers MIA are estimated at more than 300,000. Hanoi and Washington are assisting each other’s efforts to locate the remains of these individuals.

Defence engagements

Vietnamese-US defence engagements will continue, although the respective militaries will not conduct combat exercises with each other.

US Navy warships visit Vietnamese ports frequently. In July, the flagship of the Japan-based US Seventh Fleet, USS Blue Ridge, visited Cam Ranh Bay.

The Vietnamese and US navies together have conducted several small-scale exercises pertaining to non-combat and non-sensitive areas such as military medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and search and rescue.

The Vietnam People’s Navy sent observers to the US-led Rim of the Pacific exercises in 2012 and 2016, and participated in the 2018 iteration. Vietnam has since declined invitations to attend the biennial drills, possibly to avoid offending China.

The VCG participates in the US-led South-east Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative and the annual South-east Asia Cooperation and Training exercises. Drills involving coast guards are less sensitive than those involving militaries.

Arms transactions

US arms sales to Vietnam may take time to increase sizeably.

The United States fully lifted its embargo on lethal arms sales to Vietnam in 2016. It has since provided security assistance under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme as well as authorising defence exports to Vietnam under direct commercial sales. FMF supported the refurbishment of the cutters for the VCG.

Vietnam’s military purchases from the US have so far been limited to non-combat equipment including reconnaissance drones, small patrol boats and training aircraft.

Reports suggest that Hanoi and Washington have held talks on the sale of second-hand F-16 fighter jets and C-130 transport aircraft. The sale of C-130s was apparently discussed but not finalised during the Austin-Giang talks.

Vietnam People’s Air Force personnel have undertaken English language training in the United States.

Factors limiting US arms sales to Vietnam include:

• wariness on Hanoi’s part about adverse reactions from Beijing;
• the cumbersome approval process in the United States, which includes obtaining permission from the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department and Congress;
• the high price of US-manufactured equipment;
• lack of interoperability with Soviet/Russian supplied equipment, which makes up the bulk of the Vietnamese military’s inventory;
• absence of deep levels of trust between the Vietnamese and US militaries, which are still developing habits of cooperation; and
• lingering fears among senior CPV leaders that the United States is trying to undermine one-party rule by promoting democracy.

Because of these constraints, it is unlikely that Vietnam will sign any major defence contracts with US companies in the near term at least.

Vietnam has other arms procurement options, including in Russia, Europe and South Korea.

Russia is problematic due to Western financial sanctions and export controls on its defence sector. Moreover, the poor performance of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine since the February 2022 invasion has caused reputational damage to Russian arms suppliers.

Still, Vietnam’s military leaders trust Moscow and are familiar with Russian weapons systems. Future defence deals with Russia, including for fighter aircraft, therefore cannot be ruled out.

UK, French and Dutch defence firms are keen to increase defence sales to Vietnam. However, European equipment is expensive and cannot be integrated easily into Vietnam’s Russian-centric armed forces.

Vietnam may look more to South Korea, a comprehensive strategic partner like Russia, China and the United States. South Korean defence equipment is technologically advanced, cheaper than its Western equivalents and can be manufactured more quickly than that of other countries. Furthermore, South Korea is willing to transfer technology that would boost Vietnam’s plans to develop an indigenous defence industry.

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Photo: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Vietnam Minister of National Defense Phan Van Giang stand for the playing of the U.S. and Vietnam national anthems during a bilateral exchange at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Sept. 9, 2024. (DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)